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RECIDIVIST STATUTE PROCEDURES
the decision in Sigma Chi will be similarly pragmatic. No doubt col-
lege authorities will adopt it as a lever for implementing both the
letter and spirit of judicial determinations supporting racial equality
in public educational institutions.3
H. HUGH STEVENS, JR.
Constitutional Law-Current Trends in Recidivist
Statute Procedures
The United States Supreme Court recently affirmed the convic-
tions of three Texas petitioners and in so doing upheld the constitu-
tionality of the common law procedure in applying recidivist
statutes.' The petitioners urged that due process was violated when
it was explained to each juror on voir dire examination that the
state was contending the petitioners had been convicted of similar
crimes earlier, and further that they were deprived of an impartial
trial and jury when the present indictment containing allegations
of the prior convictions was read and evidence of the prior convic-
tions put to the jury at trial.2 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held
that because the jury was instructed not to consider past criminal
conduct in deciding present guilt that minimum constitutional de-
mands were met.3
The case should be of interest in North Carolina since it sustains
the same procedure used here.' It should also encourage a re-exami-
clauses might be injurious to the University's position with the Fed-
eral Government because the fraternities are chartered by this institu-
tion. If this legal connection is strong enough to place the University
in jeopardy under the .1964 Civil Rights Act, then the clauses clearly
will have to go.
The Daily Tar Heel, Feb. 17, 1965, p. 2.
" See McClaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
1 Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967). The three cases disposed of
are reported below as Reed v. Beto, 343 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Spencer
v. Texas, 389 S.W.2d 304 (1965); Bell v. Texas, 387 S.W.2d 411 (1965).
'Brief for Petitioner, pp. 4-5, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
'87 Sup. Ct. at 653.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-147 (1965) ; State v. Lawrence, 264 N.C. 220, 141
S.E.2d 264 (1965); State v. Morgan, 263 N.C. 400, 139 S.E.2d 708 (1965);
State v. Painter, 261 N.C. 332, 134 S.E.2d 638 (1964) ; State v. Powell, 254
N.C. 231, 118 S.E.2d 617 (1961); State v. Stone, 245 N.C. 42, 95 S.E.2d
77 (1956); State v. Miller, 237 N.C. 427, 75 S.E.2d 242 (1953); State v.
Davidson, 124 N.C. 839, 32 S.E. 957 (1899).
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nation of the procedure in the light of the state's policy of providing
a fair trial and jury."
It has long been recognized that while evidence of prior convic-
tions is relevant and of probative value, it is so highly prejudicial
that, with limited exceptions, a fair trial demands its exclusion.6
Such evidence is generally admitted only in cases where the defen-
dant raises the question of his own character or where defendant
offered himself as a witness.
7
The common law recidivist statutes provide an additional ave-
nue for placing this same evidence before the jury notwithstanding
its volatile nature. The justifying rationale is that the jury is, upon
proper instructions, to suppress the knowledge of prior crimes in
deciding the issue of guilt in the present case. This is questionable.
There is much controversy among authorities as to how effectively
jurors are able to accomplish this mental juxtaposition,8 but it is
safe to assume that even the most intellectually agile and impartial
juror would be hard pressed by the task. Because of this the major-
ity of American jurisdictions and England have changed their pro-
cedures to conform with the spirit of providing an impartial jury
and not with just meeting the minimum standard that will be toler-
ated. Twenty-seven states'0 have by statute or decision adopted some
form of bifurcation procedure whereby evidence of prior crimes is
withheld from the jury until the question of guilt in the present
'U.S. CONsT. amend. VI; N.C. CONST. art I, § 13.
' Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948); State v. Tessnear,
265 N.C. 319, 144 S.E.2d 43 (1965); State v. McLamb, 235 N.C. 251, 69
S.E.2d 537 (1952); McCoRmICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954); STANSBURY,
NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 104 (2d ed. 1963); 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§ 57 (3d ed. 1940).
' McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 157 (1954); STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA
EVIDENCE § 104 (2d ed. 1963); 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 192-94 (3d ed.
1940); 28 N.C.L. REV. 124 (1949).
8 Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539 (1947); United States v. Banmiller, 310 F.2d
720 (3d Cir. 1962). For an extended discussion on juries, their functions,
and effectiveness, see Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 167 F.2d 54
(2d Cir. 1948).
*The difficulty is evidenced by the fact that in Spencer v. Texas the
majority at 554 and the minority at 660 both cited KALVEN & ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 180 (1966) as support for their respective positions.
1 Researchers have reached different results on the exact number of
states. See, 87 Sup. Ct. at 665 where 28 states are listed and North Caro-
lina Attorney General as Amicus Curiae, pp. 7-8, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup.
Ct. 648 (1967) where it is maintained that less than half the states have
adopted new procedures. This researcher found that 27 states now apply
a two-step procedure. See note 11 infra.
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indictment is determined. Then, if the defendant is convicted, a
second determination is made as to the prior convictions for sentenc-
ing purposes." These procedures assure a fair trial while still per-
mitting the state to effectuate its policy of increased sentences for
habitual criminals. It is significant to note that Texas has joined
the majority of states now using a bifurcation procedure since the
convictions of the petitioners of Spencer v. Texas"2 and that the
Attorney General of Texas even while urging affirmance acknowl-
edged that there could be a "better method of proving prior crimes
for the purpose of enhancing punishment. . ". .. , The majority in
Spencer v. Texas while upholding constitutionality also noted the
inferiority of the single step procedure.' 4 In his concurring opinion
Justice Stewart stated that "it is clear to me that the recidivist pro-
cedures adopted in recent years by many other states . . . are far
superior to those utilized in the cases now before us."' 5
The North Carolina Attorney General filed an amicus curiae
brief in Spencer v. Texas asking the Court to uphold the common
law procedure and thereby sanction the North Carolina approach. 6
The conclusion of the Attorney General's brief states:
" Those states now employing a two step procedure in applying re-
cidivist statutes are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.060 (Supp. 1966);
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2328 (1964); Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 39-13-3 (1963); Connecticut, Conn. Public Act. No. 588 § 5310
(1963); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 3912(b) (Supp. 1966);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.11 (1965; Idaho, IDAHO CODE: ANN. § 19-
2514 (1948); Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-107a 1964); Louisiana, LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1 (Supp. 1965); Maryland, MD. RuLE OF PROC.
713 (1963); Michigan, MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.1085 (1954); Minnesota,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.155 (1964); Nebraska, NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-2221
(1964); New York, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1943; New Mexico, Johnson v.
Cox, 72 N.M. 55, 380 P.2d 199 (1963); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12-06-23 (1960); Ohio, OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2961.13 (1954); Okla-
homa, OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 22, § 860 (Supp. 1966); Oregon, ORE. REv.
STAT. § 168.065 (Supp. 1963); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5108
(1963); South Dakota, S.D. CODE § 13.0611 (1939); Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-2801 (1955) as construed in Harrison v. State, Tenn., 394
S.W.2d 713 (1965); Texas, TEx. CODE OF CIUM. PROc. ANN. art. 36.01
(1966); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-19 (1953); Virginia, VA. CODE
ANN. § 53-296 (Supp. 1966); Washington, WASH. REv. CODE ARN. § 9.92.
090 (1961); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-19 (1966).
a, TEx. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 36.01 (1966).
18 Brief of Respondent, p. 9. Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
1, 87 Sup. Ct. at 655, 656.
'Id. at 656.
"Appreciation is extended to the Office of the Attorney General of
North Carolina for furnishing briefs of counsel as well as its own amicus
curiae brief.
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North Carolina, therefore, asks that its procedure shall re-
main in force and not be disturbed. The criminals of the under-
world are not stupid, and they quickly become aware of the facts
that repeated acts of crime can bring more severe punishment.
When a State legislature says that a prior conviction can bring
about increase of punishment and a State supreme court holds
that the issue as to the prior conviction can be tried at the same
time as the trial of the subsequent offense, then why should the
criminal be protected as to his criminal record? We suggest that
the protection of law abiding citizens who go about their daily
lives should weigh more heavily than the protection of the crimi-
nal.
17
It is submitted that the force behind the current trend toward
two-step trials is not to undermine the purpose of recidivist statutes
nor to protect the convicted criminal from his past record nor to
lessen the law abiding citizen's protection. Rather, an effort is being
made to afford every defendant a fairer trial untainted by prejudicial
evidence normally excluded.' It is to remove the means by which
prosecutors under the guise of due process and statutory fulfillment
circumvent established rules of evidence.'" It is further submitted
that no valid state policy should be founded upon advocation of a
procedure on its face inferior to alternatives having not only the
same ultimate effect but also desirable intermediate safeguards. For
these reasons North Carolina should consider amending its statutes
so that prosecutors are denied probative benefit derived from intro-
" Brief of the Attorney General of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae,
p. 13, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
8 See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. Compare, Collins v. State,
70 Okla. Crim. 340, 106 P.2d 273 (1940) where it is held that a defendant
is presumed innocent and therefore entitled to appear in court in civilian
clothing rather than prison garb. Is the distinction between the state's
physically dressing a defendant in prison clothing and mentally dressing
him the same way with evidence of prior convictions great? Cf. Shultz v.
State, 131 Fla. 757, 179 So. 764 (1938).
" The principal case is a prime example of this. There the defendant
attempted to stipulate before the trial that he had been convicted earlier as
the indictment alleged. The prosecutor refused to accept the stipulation and
used the recidivist statute to present evidence to the jury of the defendant's
criminal record. 87 Sup. Ct. at 662.
Three states by statute and case law allow the defendant to stipulate his
prior record even though not providing a two step trial. See, CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1025; ARIz. RuIEs CRIM. PR0C. 180 (1956); State v. Meyer, 258
Wis. 326, 46 N.W.2d 341 (1951). Quaere whether it is good policy to force
a defendant to make the impossible choice between stipulating a false allega-
tion in order to exclude prejudicial evidence or allowing the prejudicial
evidence in order to avoid enhanced punishment under the state's recidivist
statute.
1042 [Vol. 45
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duction of evidence going only to the question of sentencing ° To
do so would effectuate the due process standards by affording an
impartial jury to every defendant.
The simpliest yet most expedient bifurcation procedure is the
so called Connecticut method2 1 whereby the indictment contains two
pages. On the first page are allegations pertaining to the present
crime. On the second page are allegations of prior crimes to be used
in imposing sentence. The defendant is, in the absence of the jury,
read both pages to give him notice of the charges. Then the jury is
read only the first page. If they return a guilty verdict then the
second page is read to them and a fiinding is made as to the prior
crimes. Thus, one jury and one trial is utilized in deciding both
questions but the defendant is not deprived of full due process by
having a jury decide the question of his guilt with the knowledge
of prior convictions in mind.
In addition to the prejudicial aspect of the present statute, per-
haps the practical desirability for amendment should be examined
in light of the Supreme Court's present decision, recent decisions,
and possible future holdings. The recent decisions dealing with
voluntariness of confessions,2 2 right to a transcript on appeal,m right
to counsel,2 4 and pre-trial publicity 5 leave no room to doubt the
Court's concern for fair trial under the due process clause. In
Spencer v. Texas this same concern is evidenced in the extensive dis-
" It should be noted that the North Carolina Court has construed the
recidivist statute strictly. In several cases tacit recognition of the prejudicial
effect of the statute has been shown where convictions of the principal
crime were reversed even though the sentence imposed did not exceed that
permissible for a first offender. In these cases minor procedural technicali-
ties in applying the statute were not met. State v. Powell, 254 N.C. 231,
118 S.E.2d 617 (1961); State v. Stone, 245 N.C. 42, 95 S.E.2d 77 (1956).
Also see State v. Painter, 261 N.C. 332, 134 S.E.2d 638 (1964) where in
reversing the court said that it was desirable if not necessary that the
warrant specify as particularly as the indictment to meet the recidivist
statute standards. State v. Miller, 237 N.C. 427, 75 S.E.2d 242 (1953)
where the indictment was held inadequate.
21 State v. Ferrone, 96 Conn. 160, 113 Atl. 452 (1921). For codification
see, UTAH CODE, ANN. § 76-1-19 (1953).
22 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1963); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1963), where a two
step procedure was required in determining the admission of a confession.
2" Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) ; Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
" Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Marshall v. United States,
360 U.S. 310 (1959).
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senting opinions of the Chief Justice and Justice Fortas, 6 joined by
Justices Brennan and Douglas in a separate dissent." Nor is there
much comport for the proponent of the Status quo in the majority's
reluctant affirmance."8 The announcement by Justice Clark, who
voted with the majority, that he intends to retire from the Court 9
further weakens the holding of Spencer and leaves to speculation
whether his replacement would vote for or against affirming if and
when the question is again presented. More importantly, two of the
dissenting Justices felt that the common law procedure for applying
recidivist statutes "undermined 'the very integrity of the fact finding
process' "30 and would have applied their dissents retroactively. As
is noted in the North Carolina Attorney General's amicus curiae
brief, to strike down the common law procedure would be to nullify
North Carolina statutes and holdings."1 To apply such a decision
retroactively would also nullify convictions obtained using these pro-
cedures. Thus, it would seem prudent to consider changing the
statute on these very practical grounds as well as on the policy basis
discussed above.
PHILIP G. CARSON
Criminal Law and Procedure-Harmless Error
The harmless-error statutes and rules' now utilized by all the
states and in the federal judicial system2 are the product of judicial
"87 Sup. Ct. at 656.
'" Id. at 666.
"See notes 14 and 15 supra and accompanying text.
"Time, Mar. 10, 1967, p. 22.
'o 87 Sup. Ct. at 666. Compare, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1965).
'1 Brief of the Attorney General of North Carolina as Amicus Curiae,
p. 2, Spencer v. Texas, 87 Sup. Ct. 648 (1967).
'Typical of the harmless-error provisions is the California harmless-
error provision which provides:
No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in any case,
on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admis-
sion or rejection of evidence, or for any error as to any matter of
pleading, or for any error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after
an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court
shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in
a miscarriage of justice.
CAL. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4Y2.
'28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1965) provides:
On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the
1044 [V'ol. 45
